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Abstract—We investigate the possibility of developing physical
layer network coding (PNC) schemes with embedded strong
secrecy based on standard QAM modulators. The proposed
scheme employs a triple binning approach at the QAM front-
end of the wireless PNC encoders. A constructive example of
a strong secrecy encoder is presented when a BPSK and an 8-
PAM modulator are employed at the wireless transmitters and
generalized to arbitrary M -QAM modulators, assuming channel
inversion is attainable at the first cycle of the transmission.
Our preliminary investigations demonstrate the potential of using
such techniques to increase the throughput while in parallel not
compromise the confidentiality of the exchanged data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the ideas of network coding (NC) have been
extended to the wireless physical medium; notably, in [1], [2],
[3], among others, the idea of harnessing interference through
structured codes was explored in the framework of physical
layer network coding (PNC). In such settings, the basic secrecy
problem related to distributed communications is that two
nodes want to communicate securely, but no direct link is
available. Hence, they have to resort to communicating via a
potentially hostile relay, who should not gain any information
on the transmitted secret messages. The generic system model
with two independent sources and one relay is depicted in
Fig. 1 and assumes that communication is executed in two
cycles. In the first cycle, the nodes A, denoted as Alice, and
B, denoted as Bob, transmit simultaneously codewords xA
and xB , respectively, to the relay node R, denoted as Ray. In
the second cycle, Ray, transmits a function f(xA + xB) of
the received signals; Alice and Bob then retrieve each other’s
messages by canceling off their corresponding transmissions.
Depending on the transformation f(·) executed by Ray, one
of the following relaying strategies can be employed [1]:
• Decode and forward: Ray decodes the transmitted mes-
sages, at least partially and then transmits a re-encoded
(aggregate) message. Such approaches have been shown
to be interference limited.
• Compress and forward: Ray is not required to decode the
messages transmitted but simply to describe its observa-
tion to the destinations. To this end, the observed signal
is quantized and transmitted to the destinations.
• Amplify and forward: Ray simply acts as a repeater. The
main drawback of this approach is the aggregation of
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Fig. 1. Physical layer network coding (PNC) with two transmitter and one
relay node.
noise over the system. Such approaches have been shown
to be noise limited.
• Compute and forward: Recently, in [1], [2] a novel
strategy in which Ray decodes linear equations of the
transmitted signals and forwards them to the destinations
was introduced.
Earlier related work included the investigation of the secrecy
capacity of interference channels in various settings [4], [5],
[6]. In the present contribution, we focus on the PNC setting
and use a variation of the compress and forward strategy
when the channel state information (CSI) is available to
Alice and Bob prior to their transmissions and M -QAM
modulators are employed for the encoding of secret messages.
Furthermore, we assume that the channel coefficients remain
constant during each transmission slot. During the first cycle
Alice and Bob employ channel inversion strategies in their
respective transmitters and broadcast M -QAM symbols. We
propose the use of a triple binning of the QAM symbols at the
source with the largest QAM constellation, hereafter assumed
to be Bob without loss of generality. Each of Bob’s M -QAM
symbols is partitioned into:
1) a bin of information bits that can be either secret bits
(elements of messages that should be kept secret from
Ray), or, common bits (elements of public messages
intended to all receivers),
2) a bin of bits used by Bob to enable the transmission of
his secret bits,
3) a bin of bits used by Bob to help Alice make a local
decision regarding the transmission of her secret bits.
The proposed technique is outlined with an example in section
III. Our goal is to investigate possible mapping schemes using
QAM modulators that allow Ray to obtain estimates of linear
combinations of the transmitted QAM symbols but not to
retrieve any of the secret bits they carry, thus achieving strong
secrecy (per QAM symbol instead of per transmission frame).
The paper is organized as follows. In section II the system
model is presented. In section III a generic scheme that
achieves strong secrecy is built, starting from a noiseless ideal
scenario. Subsequently, this scheme is employed in section
IV where a secure PNC architecture is proposed in a realistic
channel setting. Finally in section V the conclusions of this
contribution are drawn and future directions of the work are
outlined.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Communication between Alice and Bob with the help of
Ray takes place in transmission frames and is executed into
two cycles. The first cycle from Alice and Bob to Ray spans
n transmission slots while the second cycle from Ray to Alice
and Bob spans m transmission slots, where n,m are positive
integers. In the first cycle Alice and Bob employ channel
inversion at their respective transmitters while in the second
cycle Ray employs a constant power policy. The transmission
scheme is explained in further detail in subsections II-A and
II-B.
A. First transmission cycle
In the first cycle Alice transmits to Ray a message sA =
[sA(1), . . . , sA(q)] ∈ SqA, whose elements are uniformly
drawn from a set of source symbols SA. To this end, Alice
employs an encoding function ϕA : SqA → XnA , with XA a set
of rectangular MA-QAM symbols of size mA = log2(MA)
bits. Each codeword is a sequence of n QAM symbols denoted
by xA = ϕA(sA), xA = [xA(1), . . . , xA(n)]T , with average
energy,
E
[|xA|2
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[|xA(i)|2
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
MA − 1
6
EA(i),
(1)
where EA(i) is the minimum distance of the QAM constella-
tion during block i. Denoting by hA(i) the channel coefficient
between Alice and Ray during block i, to implement channel
inversion we pre-multiply the QAM symbols by h∗A(i)|hA(i)|2 , so
that,
EA(i) =
2
|hA(i)|2 , i = 1, . . . , n. (2)
At present, we assume that Alice is not power limited, i.e., it
is always possible to transmit with energy per bit as described
in (2). We note that although channel inversion is impractical
in Rayleigh environments, it can be employed whenever a
line of sight (LOS) exists between either transmitter and
Ray, i.e., whenever a Rician, a Nakagami-m or other large
scale fading channel model [7] is applicable. In future work,
we intend to investigate more general approaches regarding
pre-equalization techniques at Alice and Bob, e.g., based on
minimum mean square error (MMSE) pre-equalizers.
Similarly, Bob transmits to Ray a message sB =
[sB(1), . . . , sB(p)] ∈ SpB , whose elements are uniformly
drawn from a set of source symbols SB . Bob employs an en-
coding function ϕB : SpB → XnB , with XB a set of rectangular
MB-QAM symbols, each of length mB = log2(MB) bits.
Each codeword at Bob is a sequence of n MB-QAM symbols
denoted by xB = ϕB(sB), xB = [xB(1), . . . , xB(n)]T , with
average energy,
E
[|xB|2
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[|xB(i)|2
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
MB − 1
6
EB(i),
(3)
where EB(i) is the minimum distance of the QAM con-
stellation during block i. Similarly, denoting by hB(i) the
channel coefficient between Bob and Ray during block i,
to implement channel inversion we pre-multiply the QAM
symbols by h
∗
B
(i)
|hB(i)|2
, so that,
EB(i) =
2
|hB(i)|2 , i = 1, . . . , n. (4)
Again, we assume that Bob is always able to transmit with
energy per bit as described in (4).
During transmission slot i (corresponding to one channel
coefficient), the signal received by Ray can be expressed as
follows:
y(i) = hA(i)xA(i) + hB(i)xB(i) + w(i), (5)
where w(i) is a zero-mean circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian random variable with variance σ2. Thus, the received
observation vector at Ray at the end of the first transmission
cycle is given as:
y = hAxA + hBxB +w (6)
where y = [y(1), . . . , y(n)]T , xA = [xA(1), . . . , xA(n)]T ,
xB = [xB(1), . . . , xB(n)]
T
, hA = diag(hA(1), . . . , hA(n)),
hB = diag(hB(1), . . . , hB(n)), w = [w(1), . . . , w(n)]
T
.
At the Relay, the decoding functions φ : Yn → Sk and
φA : Yn → SqA, φB : Yn → SpB are used to recover from the
observations a function of the secret messages sA, sB denoted
by s = f(sA, sB) as well as the secret messages individually.
The error probabilities associated with the codes (ϕA, ϕB , φ),
(ϕA, ϕB , φA) and (ϕA, ϕB , φB) are defined as:
Pe = Pr (φ(y) 6= s) , (7)
P (a)e = Pr (φA(y) 6= sA) , (8)
P (b)e = Pr (φB(y) 6= sB) . (9)
Strong strong secrecy can be achieved with respect to Ray if
limn→∞ I(SA;Y ) = 0, limn→∞ I(SB;Y ) = 0. The secret
messages can be transmitted by at rates R(A)s and R(B)s , with
R(A)s ≤ H(SA|Y ), (10)
R(B)s ≤ H(SB|Y ). (11)
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Fig. 2: pmfs of the transmitted and observed symbols
B. Second transmission cycle
In the second cycle of the communication, Ray transmits
PNC symbols x = [x(1), . . . , x(t)]T to Alice and Bob.
Towards this end, Ray employs an encoding function θ : Sk →
X t, with X a set of rectangular MR-QAM symbols each of
size mR = max(mA,mB). Each codeword is a sequence of t
QAM symbols denoted by x = θ(x), x = [x(1), . . . , x(t)]T ,
with average energy,
E
[|x|2] = 1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[|x(i)|2] = MR − 1
6
ER. (12)
Here for simplicity we set ER = 2, although a double
waterfilling algorithm could be designed to optimize the power
allocation across both communication links from Ray to Alice
and from Ray to Bob. At present this is left as future work.
During the second part of the transmission, the channel
coefficient between Alice and Ray in time slot i is denoted
by h˜A(i) while the channel coefficient between Bob and
Ray is denoted by h˜B(i). In analogy to the first part of the
transmission, the received observation vectors at Alice and
Bob at the end of the second transmission cycle are given as:
zA = h˜Ax+wA, (13)
zB = h˜Bx+wB, (14)
where zA = [zA(1), . . . , zA(t)]T , zB = [zB(1), . . . , zB(t)]T ,
x = [x(1), . . . , x(t)]T , h˜A = diag(h˜A(1), . . . , h˜A(t)), h˜B =
diag(h˜B(1), . . . , h˜B(t)), wA = [wA(1), . . . , wA(t)]
T
, wB =
[wB(1), . . . , wB(t)]
T
.
Furthermore, the decoding functions θA : ZtA → SqB and
θB : ZtB → SpA are used by Alice and Bob respectively
to decode the individual messages transmitted from Bob and
Alice based on the PNC observations. The error probabilities
associated with the codes (ϕA, φ, θ, θA) and (ϕB, φ, θ, θB)
during a complete transmission frame are defined as
P (A)e = Pr (θA(zA) 6= sB|sA) , (15)
P (B)e = Pr (θB(zB) 6= sA|sB) . (16)
In the following, we focus on information theoretic strong
secrecy; we are interested in building encoders at rates R(A)s
and R(B)s (at Alice and Bob, respectively), such that for small
TABLE I
M -PAM CONSTELLATIONS
M Mapping to constellation points
2 1, 0
8 111, 110, 100, 101, 001, 000, 010, 011
ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 > 0 the following conditions hold:
Pe 6 ǫ1, (17)
P (A)e 6 ǫ2, (18)
P (B)e 6 ǫ3, (19)
R(A)s ≤ H(SA|Y ), (20)
R(B)s ≤ H(SB|Y ). (21)
To demonstrate how strong secrecy can be achieved, we start
by examining the noiseless scenario and concentrate on the
design of mapping functions that satisfy (20) and (21) with
equality.
III. ACHIEVING STRONG SECRECY WITH TRIPLE BINNING
QAM MODULATORS
In subsections III-A and III-B we present a constructive
approach to develop the required encoders. We start with a
basic example in which asymptotically 1 bit can be transmitted
with strong secrecy assuming that Alice employs a BPSK
modulator and Bob an 8-PAM modulator, in the absence of
noise sources and ideal channel conditions. The proposed
technique is generalized to arbitrary MA-QAM and MB-QAM
modulators in subsection III-B.
A. Basic scenario
At present we neglect all noise sources and set all chancel
gains equal to unity. In our approach we employ a BPSK
modulator at Alice transmitting symbols xA, and an 8-PAM
modulator at Bob transmitting symbols xB . The constellations
of the BPSK and the 8-PAM are assumed as shown in Table
I. Based on our system model, during each transmission block
Ray simply observes the sum of a BPSK symbol and an 8-
PAM symbol, i.e.,
y = xA + xB. (22)
The probability mass functions (pmf) of the BPSK, the 8-
PAM and of Ray’s observation are depicted in Fig. 1(a), 1(b)
and 1(c), respectively. Regarding the decoding of xA and xB
TABLE II
RAY’S OBSERVATION, DETECTION AND GENERATION OF THE PNC CODEWORD
y −8 −6 −4 −2 0 +2 +4 +6 +8
(xA,xB) (−1,−7) (−1,−5) (−1,−3) (−1,−1) (−1,+1) (−1,+3) (−1,+5) (−1,+7) —
— (+1,−7) (+1,−5) (+1,−3) (+1,−1) (+1,+1) (+1,+3) (+1,+5) (+1,+7)
s = f(y) −7 −5 −3 −1 +1 +3 +5 +7 −7
by Ray, with probability 0.0625 it can be correctly decoded
as (xˆA, xˆB) = (−1,−7) when y = −8 and with probability
0.0625 as (xˆA, xˆB) = (1, 7) when y = 8. In all other cases
xA cannot be decoded. This effect is explained in Table III-A,
where also a “re-wrapping” approach for Ray’s PNC encoding
scheme s = f(y) is presented.
We assume that both Alice and Bob have separate queues of
“secret” (s) and “common” (c) bits, denoted by Q(A)s and Q(A)c
for Alice and Q(B)s and Q(B)c for Bob respectively. During
each transmission interval Alice and Bob make local decisions
to transmit either a bit from Q(A)s or Q(A)c and Q(B)s or Q(B)c
respectively. Their actions do not necessarily coincide, i.e.,
Bob might decide to transmit a bit from Q(B)s while Alice
decides to transmit a bit from Q(A)c and vice versa.
Furthermore, we note that as depicted in Fig. 1(c) secrecy
cannot be achieved neither by Bob nor by Alice when Bob
transmits either of his 8-PAM edge constellation points, i.e.,
when Bob transmits x11, with x∈ {0, 1}. In all other occasions
both Alice and Bob can transmit one secret bit each. Therefore,
whenever Bob transmits x11, then x should be drawn from
Q(B)c and also Alice should transmit a bit from Q(A)c . In all
other cases Bob and Alice can securely transmit one bit each
from their respective queues Q(B)s and Q(A)s . To exploit this
effect, the central idea in our approach is to use Alice’s BPSK
transmission to potentially “mask” the first of Bob’s bits while
use the remaining two bits in Bob’s QAM symbol for indexing.
As a result, Bob’s QAM symbols are partitioned into three
bins. The first of Bob’s bits is mapped to a bin of information
bits. The remaining two bits are split into two partitions KB
and KA, of sizes KB = |KB| and KA = |KA|. The bits
in partition KB are used by Bob to index his transmission
when a secret bit from Q(B)s or when a common bit from
Q(B)c is sent over the wireless channel. In analogy the bits in
partition KA are used by Bob to notify Alice whether in the
next transmission slot she should be transmitting a bit from the
queue Q(A)s or from the queue Q(A)c ; we assume that Alice
always uses this information (when available) to make her
local decision. Naturally, since one out of three bits is used to
carry information,
KA +KB ≤ 2. (23)
There are two options regarding the use of the indexing bits.
Option 1: KB = 2,KA = 0: A first option is to use
the last two bits of the 8-PAM symbol to index only Bob’s
transmission, i.e., KB = 2 (which implies KA = 0), so that
Bob transmits a common bit when his index is 11 and a secret
bit in all other cases, i.e., Bob can achieve a secrecy rate
R
(B)
s =
6
8 =
3
4 . In this scheme there is no feedback to Alice
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Fig. 3. Architecture of the basic scheme.
who cannot transmit with any guaranteed strong secrecy, i.e.,
R
(A)
s = 0.
Option 2: KB = 1,KA = 1: As a second option, if the
second of Bob’s bits is used as an index for Bob and the third
of the bits is used as an index for Alice, i.e., KB = 1 and
KA = 1, then Bob shall transmit a common bit whenever his
index is 1 and a secret bit when his index is 0. This in turn
means that Bob will transmit a bit from Q(B)c when either of
the four edge constellation points are transmitted, i.e., when
either x11 or x10 is transmitted and a bit fromQ(B)s in all other
cases, leading to a secrecy rate of R(B)s = 48 =
1
2 . In parallel,
Alice is notified whether she should transmit a common bit in
the next transmission interval when her indexing bit is 1 or a
secret bit when her indexing bit is 0, leading to a secrecy rate
of R(A)s = 48 =
1
2 .
Alice’s index bit on slot i is related to Bob’s index bit on
slot i + 1; in particular, in the specific scheme these should
coincide. A simple implementation of the approach is depicted
in Fig. 3 . During an initialization slot a sequence of random
bits is generated at Bob and stored in a queue Q(B)k . These
bits are used as index bits for Alice (bits in partition KA). A
shifted version of this sequence is also used as index bits for
Bob (bits in partition KB). Finally, the latter control a switch
between Bob’s queues Q(B)s and Q(B)c . We note in passing
that it can be shown that Bob’s symbols’s distribution remains
uniform.
Using timesharing techniques we can let the sizes of the
partitions KA and KB take any values between [0, 2] as long
as they satisfy (23). The secrecy rates that are achievable when
employing an 8-PAM modulator and a BPSK modulator can
thus be expressed as:
R(A)s ≤ 1− 2−KA , (24)
R(B)s ≤ 1− 2−KB . (25)
In Fig. 4 the achievable secrecy rates are depicted for a
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modulators with MB = 64.
BPSK and an M = 4, 8, 16, 32, 64-QAM modulators at Alice
and Bob. As M increases, we can asymptotically transmit 1
bit/sec/Hz with strong secrecy.
B. Generalization to arbitrary PAM and QAM modulators
We generalize the above methodology to propose triple bin-
ning encoders based on using an MA-PAM modulator at Alice
and an MB-PAM modulator at Bob. We denote the lengths
of the PAMs by mA = log2(MA) and mB = log2(MB)
respectively and assume that MA ≤MB .
Proposition 1: Using the proposed triple binning approach, the
maximum achievable secrecy rates by Bob or Alice are upper
bounded by τ = min(mA,mB):
R(A)s ≤ τ, and R(B)s ≤ τ. (26)
Sketch of proof: The proof of (26) is straightforward as a result
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Fig. 6. Secrecy rates at Bob and Alice using an MA-QAM and an M2-QAM
modulators with MB = 64.
of the data processing theorem:
R(A)s = H(SA|Y ) ≤ H(SA) ≤ τ, (27)
R(B)s = H(SB|Y ) ≤ H(SB) ≤ τ. (28)
Proposition 2: The limit R(A)s = τ and R(B)s = τ can
be achieved when the largest of the constellations becomes
arbitrarily long, i.e., when MB →∞.
Sketch of proof: Security is compromised when one of the
MA edge points of Ray’s observation pmf is received. The
probability of this event is MA
MA+MB−1
and as a result:
R(A)s = H(SA|Y ) = τ −
MA
MA +MB − 1 → τ, (29)
R(B)s = H(SB |Y ) = τ −
MA
MA +MB − 1 → τ. (30)
Theorem: We assume that Alice and Bob use PAMs of sizes
MA and MB . Setting T = max(mA,mB) and using a triple
binning approach we can achieve all secrecy rates in the
convex hull delimited by the pairs R(A)s and R(B)s :
R(A)s ≤ τ − 2−KA , (31)
R(B)s ≤ τ − 2−KB , (32)
with KA,KB ∈ [0, T − τ ],KA +KB ≤ T − τ. (33)
The proof is omitted due to space limitations. In Fig.
5 the achievable secrecy rates are depicted for MA =
2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256 and MB = 64.
Finally, viewing an M -QAM modulator as two orthogonal√
M -PAM modulators results in the doubling of the secrecy
rates when 2-dimensional modulators are employed, e.g., when
Alice employs a QPSK and Bob an MB-QAM modulator
(MB ≥ 4) then asymptotically 2 secret bits can be exchanged
in each transmission slot as MB increases. The achievable
secrecy rates when Alice employs an MA-QAM modulator
and Bob a 64-QAM modulator are shown in Fig. 6.
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IV. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE IN NOISY CHANNELS
In the noiseless case no error control is required and the
transmission of secret messages can take place independently
from one slot to the next. However, in the presence of noise
and other channel impairments such as large scale fading,
channel encoders need to be employed to handle the errors
introduced by the wireless channel. As a result, to ensure both
reliability and secrecy the transmission of secret messages is
spread over n subsequent slots as described in section II.
In the schematic diagram in Fig. 7 a proposal for Bob’s
(resp. Alice’s) transmitter and Ray’s receiver are shown.
Three independent block channel encoders are inserted at the
outputs of Bob’s common, secret and index bits sources to
introduce the necessary redundancy to handle the channel
errors. Furthermore, as shown in Fig. 8, at Alice’s (resp. Bob’s)
receiver the corresponding channel decoders are used. In the
proposed approach, the tasks of reliability and secrecy are
handled independently by separate parts of the transceiver. In
the future we will investigate the use of lattice encoders to
propose a comprehensive PNC approach that jointly achieves
reliability and secrecy.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A scheme that achieves strong secrecy was presented using
standard M -QAM modulators. We introduced a novel triple
binning approach in the largest of the QAM constellations.
In our approach, the QAM symbols are generated as the
concatenation of i) a bin that carries information bits (secret
or common), ii) a bin that carries index bits intended for Bob
and iii) a bin that carries index bits for Alice. We have shown
that on a per symbol basis it is possible to asymptotically
transmit as many secret bits as the length of the shortest of the
QAM symbols. Furthermore, accounting for real channels we
proposed the use of independent block encoders to alleviate the
effects of noise and fading, while the possibility of using lattice
encoders will be investigated in the future. Finally, alternative
power allocation schemes will also be examined.
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